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Abstract. Although economists often model decision makers as rational actors, the heuristics and biases literature that 
springs from the work of Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman and his late colleague Amos Tversky demonstrates that 
people make decisions that depart from the optimal model in systematic ways.  These cognitive and behavioral 
limitations not only cause inefficient decision making, but also lead people to make decisions that are unethical.  This 
article seeks to introduce a selected portion of the heuristics and biases and related psychological literature, to highlight 
its implications for ethical decision making, and to serve as the basis for a lecture that could inform students regarding 
these matters.  If business actors are on guard against errors in their own decision making processes, perhaps they can 
avoid some of the ethical pitfalls that recently put Enron and so many other companies in the news. 
Keywords: attribution theory, behavioral psychology, biases, cognitive dissonance, decision theory, escallation of 
committment, ethics, framing effects, heuristics, overconfidence, rationality, self-serving bias, sunk costs. 
1.   Introduction 
Purely by happenstance I recently found myself at two separate functions sitting next to 
individuals who had been convicted of white collar crimes in high-profile scandals of the early 
1990s.  After each event, I described both men as “the nicest guy you’d ever want to meet.”  And 
they certainly seemed to be. 
This led me to wonder why nice guys (and gals, like my students) break the law and violate 
ethical conventions.  Certainly economists have modeled criminal activity as rational decision 
making involving the weighing of potential benefits of the crime against the potential 
punishments multiplied by the chance of detection (Posner, 1977). However, most people who 
break the law and breach generally accepted ethical standards do not engage in such rational 
calculations.  Jenkins (2000) has argued that most of the principals in the latest round of corporate 
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scandals (Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, etc.) were plagued more by bad 
decision making than by an inability to recognize or analyze ethical dilemmas.  Indeed, as Costa 
(1998) has noted, “[t]here are truly sinister businesspeople with sinister intentions, but, for the 
most part, ethical and legal lapses are the stuff of average people who know better.”  
When I teach business ethics to business students in my introductory business law courses, 
accounting ethics to accounting students, or legal ethics to law school students in my securities 
regulation course, I certainly introduce them to the specifics of their particular professional code 
of conduct.  I also attempt to sensitize students to various forms of ethical dilemmas so that they 
will recognize moral quicksand when they approach it, and endeavor to give the students the 
philosophical tools with which to analyze those dilemmas when they arise. 
What I have not done a thorough job of, and I suspect that I am not alone in this, is to educate the 
students regarding their own cognitive and behavioral susceptibilities that might lead to (often 
unwitting) unethical decision making.  Preaching to the students is one approach I have tried.  
Cheerleading (“Go!  Fight!  Do the Right Thing!”) is another avenue.  However, I suspect that 
inoculating students regarding weaknesses in their own decision making processes is a superior 
approach.  Although I have no empirical data to support this intuition, I assert here that an ethics 
student can profitably explore the heuristics and biases literature pioneered by recent Nobel Prize 
winner Daniel Kahneman and his late colleague Amos Tversky.  This substantial literature 
contains overwhelming evidence that people do not always make decisions in a rationally optimal 
manner. Indeed, various heuristics and biases lead most people to systematically diverge from 
optimal decision making, as has been widely documented (e.g., Gilovich et al., 2002, Kahneman 
& Tversky, 2000, Kahneman et al., 1982). 
What is less often studied is the fact that many of these heuristics, biases, and related 
psychological tendencies can render even well-intentioned people susceptible to committing 
unethical and even illegal acts.  With a few exceptions (Messick and Tenbrunsel, 1996; Messick 
and Bazerman, 1996, Etzioni, 1988), this body of thought has received insufficient attention in 
academic ethics literature.  More to the point, as far as I am aware it has been generally ignored in 
the business school and law school classrooms when the subject of professional ethics is being 
discussed.    
This paper presents information that can readily be used as the basis for a lecture introducing 
students to the heuristics and biases in their own decision making that could lead to unethical 
behavior. 
2.   Heuristics and Biases: Ethical Applications 
In many settings people are subject to various heuristics and biases that systematically prevent 
their decision making from being objectively optimal.  As Hastie and Dawes (2001) note, “[n]ot 
only do the choices of individuals and social decision making groups tend to violate the principle 
of maximizing expected utility, they are often patently irrational.”  This section introduces several 
of these limitations of human cognition and illustrates their implications for ethical decision 
making.  
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2.1.   Obedience to Authority 
Some of the major actors in the Enron-era scandals pleaded that they were “just following 
orders.” (Lehmann, 2002).  People instinctively reject this “Good Nazi” defense, yet this gut 
reaction produces a huge disconnect in our everyday lives because all of us tend to follow 
authority.  In an attempt to understand the Holocaust, Stanley Milgram undertook his famous 
experiments on obedience to authority.  Although people to whom his experiment was described 
predicted that less than 1% of participants would obey the experimenter’s instructions to 
administer apparently injurious shocks to an innocent, protesting victim, fully 65% did so 
(Milgram, 1963, 1974).  As the inaccurate prediction illustrates, most people simply do not 
understand the great extent to which others, and especially they themselves, are susceptible to 
blindly following the instructions of people in positions of authority.   
  Because of this inclination, people are much more likely to undertake an unethical 
action in the workplace when urged to do so by a superior than to choose that unethical course of 
their own volition.  Studies by DeZoort and Lord (1994) and others show that auditors pressured 
inappropriately by their superiors are significantly more likely to accede to breaches of proper 
accounting protocol than are auditors not so pressured.  Indeed, Peecher (1996) found that 
auditors who know that their supervisors desire them to accept the clients’ nonerror explanations 
for account balance fluctuations often embrace those explanations without considering a single 
error or fraud as an alternative explanation.  Students need to be aware of this tendency so that 
they can guard against its potentially corrosive influence. 
2.2.   Social Proof 
Parents are typically ill-disposed to accept a child’s plea of “everyone else is doing it” (Green, 
1991; DeGeorge, 1991).  However, the theory of social proof tells us that those same parents, and 
everyone else, take their cues as to proper behavior in most social contexts from the actions of 
others.   In his famous experiments, Asch (1952, 1956), found that when asked to tell which of 
three lines is the same length as a fourth line, subjects have no difficulty whatsoever unless they 
are placed in an experimental condition in the presence of six confederates who gave obviously 
wrong answers.  Almost all subjects then found it very painful to give the obviously correct 
answer in contradiction of these strangers’ erroneous answers and most participants gave an 
incorrect answer at least once.  Consider how much greater the pressure to conform when the 
others in the group are co-employees and/or friends. 
Sabini and colleagues (2001) report that the most important finding of social psychology 
since World War II may be just how much people’s behavior is caused externally by situations 
rather than internally by their own disposition.  Obedience to authority and susceptibility to peer 
pressure are two significant illustrations of this external influence.  A reading of tell-all books by 
Enron insiders such as Cruver (2002) indicates that many Enron employees readily bought into 
Enron’s fast-and-loose corporate culture without fully recognizing the ethical implications of 
company practices. 
  Social proof induces executives in one company to decide that obscenely high compensation 
is ethically justified because executives at competing companies are receiving similarly  
This article is protected by copyright. A licence has been granted to Minette E. Drumwright of 
the University of Texas at Austin to include it in a featured collection on Ethics in Advertising 
and is only available to the Aspen Institute’s CasePlace.org academic members to make 1 copy 
of the paper for personal use only. Apart from this licensed copy, none of the material 
protected by the copyright notice can be reproduced or used in any form either electronic or 
mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any other information recording or 
retrieval system, without prior written permission from the owner(s) of the copyright. 
 
outrageous compensation, and induces managers and auditors to conclude that earnings 
management, capacity swaps, and other forms of accounting aggression are defensible because 
industry innovators such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom are using them (Cunningham, 2003).  
  The desire to fit into an organization, to be a team player, to get along with co-employees, it 
has been argued, accounts for Ford employees selling the Pinto despite awareness of its gas tank 
dangers, A. H. Robins employees continuing to sell the Dalkon Shield despite knowledge of its 
medical consequences, and Morton Thiokol employees remaining silent about known O-ring 
dangers.  (Costa, 1998)  The impairment of individual decision making known as “groupthink” 
can also play a role here (Esser and Lindoerfer, 1989). 
Thus, people are more likely to undertake unethical actions in the workplace and elsewhere if 
peers are engaging in similar behavior.  And they certainly are less likely to blow the whistle on 
unethical activity when peers seem to accept it, just as a bystander to a crime is less likely to help 
the victim when others nearby are not helping.  (Latane and Darley, 1968).   Sherron Watkins at 
Enron (Lochhead, 2002) and Cynthia Cooper at WorldCom (Pulliam and Solomon, 2002) simply 
did what was clearly the ethical thing— blew the whistle on blatant frauds in their firms.  These 
women are widely considered to be heroines because people intuitively realize how hard it truly 
is to act in accordance with ethical standards that are not aligned with the expectations of 
superiors and the practices of peers. 
2.3.   False Consensus Effect 
One of my dinner companions related how his loyalty to his crooked boss blinded him to the 
unethical nature of the actions he was involved in until nearly the day he was arrested.  Skeptics 
may view this as just a massive rationalization, but inclinations to follow authority and submit to 
peer pressure are reinforced by the false consensus effect, the tendency to believe that other 
people think the same way that we do, documented by Ross and his colleagues (1977).   Thus, 
honest people will tend to believe that those they interact with are honest as well.  If employees 
believe that they are honest and their supervisors are honest, then it will be particularly difficult 
for them to believe that their actions are unethical, especially if they work at a well-regarded firm 
like Enron with its famous RICE (Respect, Integrity, Communication, Excellence) code of ethics.   
Underlings at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and other companies recently embroiled in 
scandal often expressed astonishment as the more blatant of their bosses’ crooked acts came to 
light.  These employees were often involved, peripherally or directly, in some of the wrongdoing 
themselves but may not have fully recognized the ethical implications of their acts, in part 
because of the false consensus effect, which is exacerbated by the fact that people are not good at 
detecting when they are being lied to but believe that they are (Vrij, 2000).  Thus, lawyers and 
auditors, for example, too often get in bed with crooked clients without fully realizing it. 
2.4.   Overoptimism  
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Humans are an optimistic lot--so much so that they often entertain irrational beliefs.  For 
example, studies show that although they know that the national divorce rate is around 50%, 
newlyweds tend to rate their own chance of ever divorcing at 0% (Baker and Emery, 1993). 
Some scientists have suggested that optimism is evolutionarily beneficial, but it can lead to 
systematic errors in decision making and, in some circumstances it can induce conduct that 
appears unethical.  For example, Langevoort (1997) suggests that it is quite possible that in many 
cases of corporate disclosure fraud, the offending officers and directors were not consciously 
lying but instead were expressing honestly-held, but irrationally optimistic views of their firms’ 
conditions and prospects.  Irrational optimism can also play a role in plaintiffs’ (and attorneys’) 
decisions to file frivolous lawsuits, as Guthrie (2000) has shown. 
2.5.   Overconfidence 
Overoptimism is often exacerbated by overconfidence.  Psychological studies indicate that in 
many settings people are not just confident, but irrationally overconfident.  A substantial majority 
of people believe erroneously that they are better than average drivers (Svensen, 1981), more 
likely to be able to afford to own a house than their peers (Weinstein, 1980), and accurate 
eyewitnesses (Shaw & McClure, 1996).   
Overconfidence often extends to ethical realms. People tend to rate themselves as well above 
average in most traits, including honesty (Bazerman, 1998).  Businesspeople tend to believe that 
they are more ethical than their competitors (Baumhart, 1968), and studies show that most 
auditors believe that they will act more ethically than their peers (Cohen, 1995).  Overconfidence 
in one’s own ethical compass can lead people to accept their own decisions without any serious 
moral reflection.  For example, studies (Kennedy and Peecher, 1997; Kida, 1980) show that 
overconfidence in one’s ability to do perform an audit can lead to taking short-cuts that might 
look unethical in retrospect.  People’s confidence in themselves translates into confidence in the 
ethical correctness of their acts and judgments.  No wonder so many Enron-era scandal figures 
expressed surprise that anyone would question the morality, let alone legality, of their various 
activities that appear so nefarious to outsiders (Franks, 2002). 
2.6.   Self-Serving Bias 
Perhaps the most important of the heuristics and biases discussed in this article is the self-serving 
bias, and Bazerman and colleagues (2002) observe that teaching ethics in the traditional way in 
business schools will not have an impact on this bias.  So, it is imperative that students be 
educated about the self-serving bias, for even when people try their hardest to be fair and 
impartial, their judgments are inevitably shaded by it.  Is it possible that Andy Fastow believed 
that he deserved the millions of dollars he took out of the Enron special purpose entities (SPEs) in 
exchange for his “creative” efforts in taking debt off Enron’s books?  Is it possible that Bernie 
Ebbers thought he was really worth the hundreds of millions of dollars that he took (much of it 
secretly) out of WorldCom?  Is it possible that Arthur Andersen’s auditors believed that Enron’s  
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financial statements truly represented Enron’s financial condition?  Research on the self-serving 
bias suggests that it is. 
Focus for a moment on Arthur Andersen’s David Duncan, the auditor in charge of the Enron 
account.  Enron was one of Andersen’s largest clients and Duncan’s career essentially hung on 
the success of Enron.  Andersen was making a healthy $25 million a year auditing Enron and $27 
million annually by providing nonaudit services. Andersen also hoped to soon double that 
revenue to $100 million a year.  In other words, Andersen put itself as a firm, Duncan as a key 
audit partner, and Duncan’s subordinates in a position where it was in all their best interests to 
conclude that Enron was in good financial shape and to keep this key client happy by approving 
Enron’s various financial machinations as consistent with good accounting practices.  In the 
shadow of such a strong self-interest, it would have been very difficult for even an auditor with 
the best of intentions to make objective judgments, as Pentice (2000a) has indicated. 
In auditing Enron’s books, the auditors would be prone to searching for information that 
supported the conclusion that they accurately represented Enron’s financial condition and to 
ignoring evidence that contradicted that conclusion.  This is called the confirmation bias.   
Psychologists are well aware of this tendency (Russo 1996), and studies show that auditors are as 
prone to it as anyone else (Bamber et al., 1997). Related is the notion of belief persistence--the 
fact that people tend to persist in beliefs they hold long after the basis for those beliefs is 
substantially discredited (Anderson et al., 1980). 
Not only does the self-serving bias unconsciously affect the information that people seek out, 
causing them to search for confirming rather than disconfirming evidence, it also affects how they 
process that information.  Thus, when psychologists give a relatively ambiguous document to two 
groups of people holding opposing views, members of each side tend to interpret the document as 
supporting their point of view (Lord, 1979).  Koehler (1993) has shown that when scientists 
review articles, they will tend to conclude that those supporting their preexisting point of view are 
of higher quality than those opposing that view.    
Therefore, documents that a disinterested person might view as not supporting Enron’s desired 
position or not of high quality, might be viewed much differently by a self-interested Andersen 
auditor.  Similarly, makers of asbestos, tobacco and other products who initially believe them to 
be beneficial products will have difficulty processing new information regarding their 
carcinogenic effects, creating an ethical minefield, as Klayman (1996) has observed. 
The self-serving bias even affects how people remember information.  Studies show that people 
are more likely to recall evidence that supports their point of view than evidence that opposes it 
(Babad, 1997).  People involved in negotiations tend to remember information that supports their 
bargaining position more than information that undermines it (Thompson and Loewenstein, 
1992).  The audit process often requires recall of information and is thus inevitably affected by 
this aspect of the self-serving bias. 
Inevitably, subjective judgments of fairness are also affected by the self-serving bias (Jolls et al. 
1999).  In part, this means, according to one aspect of causal attribution theory, that people have a 
tendency to attribute to themselves more than average credit for their company’s or team’s 
successes and less than average responsibility for its failures (Schlenker & Miller, 1977).   
Obviously, the more subjective the judgment and the less certain the facts, the more influential 
the self-serving bias is likely to be, but the bias is pervasive and unrelenting.   
In one experiment, law students were given materials from a real case and asked to hypothetically 
represent one side.  The students were asked what they thought a fair settlement was and how  
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much they thought the judge in the case had probably awarded. The students’ judgments as to 
fairness and their estimate as to outcome were dramatically affected by whether they had been 
assigned to represent the plaintiff or the defendant (Babcock et al., 1995, Loewenstein et al., 
1993).  
Consider Enron, which was largely involved in creating new businesses involving deal terms, 
derivative structures and unusual commodities without clearly established values.  When Enron 
employees valued these terms, derivatives, and commodities, the decision determined the 
numbers Enron would put in its financial statements which, in turn, determined whether hundreds 
of millions of dollars of bonuses would be paid to the very employees who were making the 
valuations. No wonder those valuations frequently showed enormous profits when it later turned 
out that Enron lost money on the deals.  No surprise, then, that in retrospect these judgments 
appear to have been unethical. 
Thus, it is extremely important that attorneys and businesspeople realize that the judgments they 
make are inevitably affected by their own self-interest. Overbilling is a rampant problem in the 
legal profession (Gharakhanian and Krywyj, 2001), and those who get caught often have a ready 
rationalization along the lines of how valuable their work for the client has been and how hard 
and successfully they have worked for the client.  Only the self-serving bias could foster such 
rationalizations. When those judgments are later reviewed in the press or by SEC enforcement 
staff or professional disciplinary bodies, they do not appear reasonable.  Thus, students must be 
taught to have a heightened awareness of the self-serving bias and its impact. 
Psychologists have noted that the self-serving bias, when combined with overconfidence and 
overoptimism, often creates an obstacle to negotiations.  Negotiators are unable to form a realistic 
opinion regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their bargaining position.  The unrealistic 
positions that people take not only impede the negotiation process and ultimate settlement 
(Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), but may themselves appear to be ethically questionable.  What 
might appear to a bank and its lawyers as a pragmatic bargaining position might be viewed by 
more objective parties as an unconscionable attempt to take advantage of vulnerable borrowers or 
customers. 
2.7.   Framing 
If there is one overriding lesson of the heuristics and biases literature, it is that in decision 
making, context counts. A simple reframing of a question can produce a totally different answer 
from the same respondent.  People’s risk preferences change dramatically depending on whether 
an option is framed in terms of potential loss or potential gain (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995). As a 
simple example of the impact of framing, people would rather buy potato chips labeled 75% fat 
free than identical chips labeled 25% fat (Sutherland, 1993).  This framing effect has many 
implications for ethical decision making.  One is that studies by Johnson, Jamal, and Berryman 
(1991, 1996) show that auditors sometimes can be fooled by clever frames used by crooked audit 
clients.  If auditors are insufficiently wary, they may not detect fraudulent actions in a setting that 
will later make their actions look unethical.  But looking unethical is not as bad as being 
unethical, and framing effects have implications here as well.  
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Decisions made by business managers, accountants, lawyers and others often occur in a 
context where subjective factors predominate.  The self-serving bias may lead an actor to frame 
decisions in such a way as to lead to untoward conclusions.  In Enron’s declining days, the 
company actually attempted to save some money by encouraging employees to minimize travel 
expenses.  An Enron employee later wrote that he intentionally flouted the new policy. This 
might seem like a clear violation of company policy and an ethical lapse, but in the employee’s 
mind, he deserved to stay in the most expensive hotels and to eat at the best restaurants because 
of how very hard he was working. (Cruver, 2002).  Had he framed the issue in terms of the 
broader picture rather than his narrow self-serving interests, he might have acted differently   
(Kramer and Messick, 1996).  But then, maybe not, because he also noted that other employees 
were also ignoring the new policy (social proof). 
  Defense attorneys and prosecutors often “keep score” of their “wins and losses.”  When 
prosecutors, for example, frame a case as an opportunity to “win or lose” rather than to do justice, 
decision making will be impaired.  An incentive arises to drop cases that are not sure wins or to 
cut constitutional and ethical corners in order to win at all costs. (Bresler, 1996) 
  Corporate social responsibility issues are affected here as well.  If a CEO frames his or her 
responsibility only in terms of maximizing shareholder value, Blair points out that “we should not 
be surprised to find that those officers and directors are more likely to neglect such niceties as 
honesty, personal integrity, and commitment to the mutual benefit of all the participants in the 
corporate enterprise.” (Blair, 2002).  
2.8.   Process 
In decision making, context matters, as the previous section indicates.  Process also matters. 
People sometimes make much different decisions depending upon whether they are presented 
with a particular big decision, or a series of incremental decisions leading to the same point, as 
Tversky (1969) demonstrated.  Lifton (1986) noted that German doctors who participated in 
euthanasia of “undesirables” were generally introduced to the process slowly.  They were not 
initially asked to perform the deed themselves.  Rather, they were first brought to the place where 
the work was done.  Then they were asked to sign a relevant document.  Then they were to 
supervise a “mercy killing.”  Only later were they asked to do themselves what they likely would 
have refused to do had they been asked in the beginning. 
  And so it is that rather than making a significant, conscious decision to violate ethical 
precepts, people more often slide down a slippery slope in tandem with their peers in an 
organization (Loewenstein, 1996).  People who would not have signed off on bogus special 
purpose entities (SPEs) or engaged in roundtrip energy trades on the day they began working for 
Enron, slowly adapted to a corporate culture that encouraged and rewarded aggressive actions 
that increasingly crossed the line into the unethical and the illegal.    
2.9.   Cognitive Dissonance  
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Another psychological tendency that interferes with rational processing of information is 
cognitive dissonance, a process discovered by Festinger (1957).  Related to the confirmation bias, 
the notion here is that to avoid uncomfortable psychological inconsistency, once people have 
made decisions or taken positions, they will cognitively screen information and tend to reject that 
which undermines their decisions or contradicts their positions.  Langevoort (1993) has explained 
how cognitive dissonance can delay lawyers from realizing that their clients are crooks.  The 
same point has been made by Prentice (2000b) regarding auditors.  Once a person has taken a 
position (“My client is honest.”  “My employer is innovative.” “My client’s financial statements 
are accurate.”), the process of cognitive dissonance makes it difficult for the person to accurately 
process new, contradictory information.  In retrospect, what appears to have been dishonesty and 
foolhardy loyalty to an employer or client, may have been cognitive dissonance at work. 
 
2.10.   Sunk Costs 
Another factor that may keep an actor on a self-destructive course that in retrospect will appear 
unethical is the notion of sunk costs and the related phenomenon, escalation of commitment. 
While economists model hypothetical rational economic actors who do not consider sunk costs in 
deciding future courses of action, most people in real life do so.  Thus, Arkes and Blumer (1985) 
have shown that people will attend a play that they have decided they don’t really want to see just 
because they have already bought the tickets.  Worse yet, sunk costs can lead to an escalating 
commitment where people throw good money after bad in a deteriorating situation (Ross and 
Staw, 1986). The Pentagon’s behavior in the Vietnam War has been so characterized. 
Because of these phenomena, managers of an audit firm that has low-balled an audit bid in 
order to get a foot in the door to sell a client nonaudit services will have great difficulty 
discharging that client when evidence begins to come to light that it is engaged in shady 
operations.  Partners in a law firm who have hired several young associates in order to handle a 
large stream of work coming from a dot.com client will have similar difficulties.  Managers of 
companies that have poured huge amounts of resources into a particular product will have great 
difficulty scrapping that product when evidence of safety problems surface. 
  Part of this phenomenon is loss aversion, which I will address shortly.  The key point is that 
as people become used to having their job, their salary, and their perquisites, their decision 
making process is affected more substantially than they realize.  The Supreme Court surmised in 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) that a client wishing to do something scurrilous will have 
more luck inducing a long-time accountant to go along with the scheme than an accountant it has 
just hired, and the psychological evidence is consistent with this intuition.  
2.11.   The Tangible and the Abstract  
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People’s decision making is naturally impacted more by vivid, tangible, contemporaneous factors 
than by factors that are removed in time and space (Darley, 1996). They are more moved by 
relatively minor injuries to their family, friends, neighbors and even pets than to the starvation of 
millions abroad. This can cause problems that have ethical dimensions. As Loewenstein and his 
colleagues (1996) have noted, auditors who have come to identify with their client and to be 
friendly with their clients’ employees will have great difficulty making tough decisions that might 
injure that client’s and those employees’ interests when the countervailing injury is temporally 
distant and will be visited, if at all, upon a mass of faceless investors.  Attorneys have the same 
limitations.  Designers and marketers of products with safety concerns do as well, finding it 
tremendously difficult to decide to pull the plug on a product (even a Ford Pinto or a Dalkon 
Shield), lay off employees working on the product, and damage the company’s profits in the 
short-term when the potential injuries are hypothetical at this point, temporally-distant, and, 
again, will be visited upon merely statistical victims. 
 
2.12.   Time-Delay Traps 
Another aspect of the immediacy of decision making factors is the temporal.  Unfortunately, 
when an action has both short-term and long-term consequences, the former are much easier for 
people to consider (Loewenstein, 1996).  People subject to this time-delay trap in decision 
making often prefer immediate to delayed gratification, which, Ulen (1998) argues, may justify 
Social Security’s form of forced saving. 
Prentice (2000a) has noted that failure to appreciate the long-term adverse consequences of 
allowing an audit client to push the envelope in terms of legal liability and reputational damage 
may be underappreciated by auditors worried about the loss of revenue and loss of friendships 
that would immediately occur if harder choices were made.  One must suspect that the short-term 
gratification that Bernard Ebbers at WorldCom and Andrew Fastow at Enron enjoyed in the form 
of their fabulous if illicit remuneration outweighed in their minds the long-term risks of being 
caught (which may have been underappreciated due to overconfidence and overoptimism biases).  
Kraakman (1984) has noted that almost every day the financial newspapers report about another 
top corporate official who has, to his or her ultimate regret, succumbed to a time-delay trap.  
Many respected lawyers at high profile firms have been busted for billing fraud in recent years, 
one suspects for the same reason.  (Lerman, 1999) 
  Many officers at Enron found it easy to value deals they entered into for future streams of 
revenue in an optimistic fashion.  In the short term, they reaped millions of dollars of 
performance bonuses.  In the long run, many of those deals lost huge amounts of money, but in 
the long run we’re all dead.  At least Arthur Andersen and Enron are. 
2.13.   Loss Aversion  
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People detest losses more than they enjoy gains, about twice as much (Coughlin and Connolly, 
2001).  This loss aversion is probably related to the endowment effect, the notion that we easily 
attach ourselves to things and then value them m u c h  m o r e  t h a n  w e  v a l u e d  t h e m  b e f o r e  w e  
identified with them.  A simple coffee mug becomes much more valuable to us once we view it as 
part of our endowment, as Knetsch and Sinden (1984) have shown.  Wide-ranging studies 
surveyed by Horowitz and McConnell (2000) show that people typically demand seven times as 
much to part with something as they would have paid to obtain it in the first place. 
One implication of the endowment effect and loss aversion is that people will make decisions 
in order to protect their endowment that they would never have made in the first place to 
accumulate that endowment.  Consider a famous accounting case, U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 
(2d Cir. 1969).  Auditors discovered that their client had been committing a fraud that they had 
not detected.  One suspects that these auditors would never have consciously cast their lot with a 
fraudster in the first place.  But once they learned of the fraud, of their own negligence, and of 
their potential liability, they did knowingly decide to help cover up the fraud.   Darley (1996) has 
argued that it is at the cover up stage that many actors who have almost inadvertently acted 
unethically first cross over to conscious wrongdoing.  Thus, employees of manufacturers often 
find themselves covering up errors in design or testing (Vandivier, 1987).   Lawyers may begin 
by defending the tobacco industry in product liability suits and end by fraudulently concealing 
research showing links between tobacco and cancer (Zegart, 2000).  
3.   Limitations 
Certainly instruction about the heuristics and biases that affect ethical decision making will be of 
little or no benefit to that subset of students who wish to ruthlessly advance their own self-interest 
regardless of ethical constraints, but this is a small percentage of overall students.  
Also, evidence shows that some of these tendencies are very difficult to debias, even with 
experience and training.  For example, a study by Taylor and Shepperd (1998) indicates that 
overconfidence and overoptimism are very robust and therefore difficult to debias.  The effect of 
disconfirming evidence is often an increase in confidence rather than the more rational decrease 
(Geller and Pitz, 1968).  A Loewenstein et al. (1996) study of the self-serving bias discussed 
earlier asked law students assigned to hypothetically represent one side in a case to guess how 
much the judge had awarded in the case.  In one iteration, the experimenters explained the self-
serving bias to the students, and asked them to predict what their opponents would estimate the 
judge had awarded.  Informing the students affected their guess as to what their opponents would 
estimate, but had no impact on their own judgments.  In other words, the students realized how 
the self-serving bias prejudiced others’ judgments, but somehow thought that they would be 
immune to it. 
So, no panacea this.  Nonetheless, not all attempts to debias have been failures.  Emby and Finley 
(1997) had some luck debiasing framing effects.  Snyder and colleagues (1982) found that 
warning subjects of their vulnerability to the confirmation bias mitigated its influence.  McKenna 
and Myers (1997) were able to reduce overconfidence effects.  Kennedy (1995) had some luck 
minimizing aspects of the hindsight bias.    
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4.   Conclusion 
Stephen Pinker (2002), writing about the hard-wiring of human brains, noted that “[o]ur minds 
are adapted to a world that no longer exists, prone to misunderstandings correctable only by 
arduous education, and condemned to perplexity about the deepest questions we can entertain.”  
Many of those deep questions, of course, involve determining what is ethical action in given 
situations.  But it is also important to attempt to determine how to minimize susceptibility to 
those “misunderstandings” Pinker references, in order to improve ethical decision making.  As 
Darley (1996) notes, “most harmful actions are not committed by palpably evil actors carrying 
out solitary actions,… [but] by individuals acting within an organizational context.”  It is 
therefore important that well-meaning individuals be aware of their susceptibility to authority, 
peer pressure, and other organizational influences, as well as to the various heuristics and biases 
discussed in this essay. 
Organized religion has been around for centuries without moving mankind dangerously close 
to perfection, and education in the heuristics and biases literature will likely not accomplish that 
task either.  Nonetheless, by educating business students, law students, and others regarding 
weaknesses in decision making that all people share, the odds may be increased that they will 
guard against them as they attempt to lead lives as ethical professionals.  These heuristics and 
biases have been frequently studied in the management literature for the inefficient consequences 
they can create, but the unethical decisions they produce should not be underestimated.   
Educating students about these heuristics and biases may help minimize their effects. At the very 
least, it will eliminate an excuse for not acting ethically.   
  The impact of these heuristics and biases can be brought home vividly by asking students to 
take part in versions of some of the classic experiments.  Scott Plous’s book (1993) has a very 
serviceable questionnaire that quickly illustrates several of the more important points.  
 
_____________________________ 
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